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ABSTRACT 
When considering the legal implications of monitoring and surveillance in the workplace, the question 
may be asked why companies deploy computer surveillance and monitoring in the first place. Several 
reasons may be put forward to justify why more than 80% of all major American firms monitor 
employee e-mails and Internet usage. However, what most companies forget is the fact that the 
absence or presence of monitoring and surveillance activities in a company holds serious legal 
consequences for companies. From the discussion in this paper it will become apparent that there is a 
vast difference in how most countries approach this subject matter. On the one hand America does not 
afford any employee a reasonable expectation of privacy when it comes to the use of corporate 
computer resources and systems, while in contrast to this position the United Kingdom goes out of its 
way to protect each employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. This paper will not only investigate 
the different approaches followed by some of the world-leader, but will also investigate the legal 
consequences embedded in each approach. This paper will ultimately enable the reader to judge for 
himself/herself which approach his/her country should follow while being fully informed of the legal 
consequences attached to the chosen approach. 
Keywords: information security, legal issues, monitoring and surveillance, privacy 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There are various legal issues that are embedded in workplace monitoring and surveillance. Mainly, 
there are two main schools of thought that exist on this subject-matter. On the one hand there are those 
that argue that employers are the owners of the computing equipment, resources and systems and they 
therefore have a right to monitor how their property is being used, and then there are those that argue 
that employees’ rights to privacy should weigh more than that of any employer.  
When examining the relevant statutes, case law and regulations it becomes apparent that in most 
jurisdictions a notice requirement exist, but this notice of surveillance and/or monitoring is rarely 
sufficient. This paper will examine Internet and e-mail related surveillance and monitoring in the 
workplace from a comparative legal perspective. Ultimately, the aim of this paper is to inform readers 
of the current legal position existing in some of the most important jurisdictions world-wide, thereby 
enabling readers to make up their own minds on which approach their country should follow, and 
enabling readers to understand the legal consequences embedded in each approach. 
2. JUSTIFICATION FOR MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE IN THE WORKPLACE 
“Surveillance technology is neither inherently bad nor good, but …there is both good and bad 
surveillance.” 
When considering the legal implications of monitoring and surveillance in the workplace, the question 
may be asked why companies deploy computer surveillance and monitoring in the first place. Several 
reasons may be put forward to justify why more than 80% of all major American firms monitor 
employee e-mails and Internet usage. The first reason centers around employee productivity. As a 
result of the Internet and e-mails employee productivity has decreased. This is a major concern for 
employers, as Internet use surveys continue to indicate that the majority of employees spend anywhere 
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from 10 minutes to an hour every day surfing sites unrelated to doing their jobs – using their work 
computers to read virtual newspapers, or go online shopping, or even viewing naked woman. 
Secondly, network performance must be considered. Employees that download video or audio files 
from the Internet are taking up a great amount of bandwidth. It therefore makes sense that employers 
spend money on Internet monitoring tools rather than on increasing the bandwidth. Thirdly, the very 
real risk exists that a company may be held legally liable for the online activities performed by its 
employees. For example the brokerage firm of Morgan Stanley was exposed to $70 million lawsuit 
because of racist jokes that appeared on the company’s e-mail system. Also, Dow Chemicals 
discovered through computer surveillance technologies that 50 employees were using the company’s 
computers to store and send sexual or violent images, resulting in the termination of all of these 
employees. Fourthly, all companies are faced with the ever present ‘insider threat’. It is therefore 
understandable that companies will go to great lengths to protect the confidentiality of its corporate 
information and trade secrets even if it is from its own employees.  
3. MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE – THE CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE 
3.1 Introduction 
It is generally accepted that in terms of Canadian law employees enjoy very little to no privacy 
protection in the workplace when it comes to computer and email surveillance. MacIsaac observes: 
“…many employers consider electronic mail sent and received using company computer equipment 
and stored on company computer networks to be the property of the employer. From the employer’s 
perspective this is a business resource paid for by the employer and is to be used only for business 
purposes. Therefore, e-mail messages and telephone conversations made on behalf of the employee in 
the course of business should be made available for review for legitimate business and security 
reasons. For these reasons, an employee acting on behalf of their employer should have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy”. 
This view was supported in an arbitration case in which a college lab technician’s employment was 
terminated after sending unwarranted allegation against other employees to the campus-wide email 
message board. The case finding reiterated the principle of ‘office e-mail: no reasonable expectation of 
privacy’. 
Today however, a definite move towards finding a balance between monitoring and privacy may be 
observed in Canadian law. As stated in the previous chapter, the most important source of privacy 
protection in Canada is found in the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
(PIPEDA) 2000. PIPEDA recognizes the importance of finding a balance between an employer’s need 
to collect certain personal data, and an employee’s need for privacy protection. The Act states: “…the 
purpose of this part [Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector] is to establish, in an era 
in which technology increasingly facilitates the circulation and exchange of information, rules to 
govern the collection, use and disclosure of personal information in a manner that recognizes the rights 
to privacy of individuals with respect to their personal information and the need of organizations to 
collect, use or disclose personal information for purposes that a reasonable person would consider 
appropriate in the circumstances”. 
3.2 Regulatory framework – PIPEDA 
When evaluating employee surveillance within the ambit of PIPEDA the following observations 
should be made: 
(i) Firstly, the provision in PIPEDA of ‘appropriate purpose’ limits the use, collection and 
disclosure of personal information to situations which a reasonable person would deem to 
be appropriate under the circumstances. Within the ambit of the workplace this would 
imply that mere consent by an employee to surveillance is no longer sufficient as the 
provision clearly states that a reasonable person must consider the circumstances to be 
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appropriate. Therefore it may be argued that where surveillance takes place under the 
façade of creating and maintaining a harassment free and safe working environment, it is 
likely that the courts will declare such surveillance to be unlawful because of the absence 
of a known issue in response to which surveillance takes place; 
(ii) Secondly, PIPEDA requires of companies must appoint a privacy officer who will be 
responsible for ensuring that the company complies with its privacy obligations. The act 
suggests that the collection of personal workplace data no longer falls within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the company’s technology personnel, but the privacy officer must also be 
involved; 
(iii) Thirdly, the act contains specific provision relating to the notification of employees of 
workplace surveillance. It is expected of companies to: (a) identify the purpose for which 
the data is being collected; (b) obtain consent prior to collection; and (c) to limit collection 
of personal data to that which is necessary for the purposes as set out by the company. The 
aim of these provisions are to: (a) limit the type of information a company may collect; 
and (b) demand of companies to inform their employees of the surveillance policies of the 
company. The act does however contain an exception to the general rule that notice must 
be given to employees before surveillance may take place. Section 7(1) (b) of the act 
states:  “…an organization may collect personal information without the knowledge 
or consent of the individual only if …it is reasonable to expect that the collection with the 
knowledge or consent of the individual would compromise the availability or the accuracy 
of the information and the collection is reasonable for purposes related to investigating a 
breach of an agreement or a contravention of laws of Canada or a province”. 
(iv) Fourthly, the Act requires that “personal information shall be retained only as long as is 
necessary for the fulfillment of the [identified] purpose”. Therefore, this provision 
regulates an employers’ use of information after collection thereof. Employers are 
furthermore prohibited from keeping personal information for an unlimited time period. 
3.3 Employee monitoring and surveillance – The present position in Canada 
The Canadian court’s commitment to privacy protection has come to the fore in recent years. In 1999 
the B.C. Supreme Court ruled in the Weir case that e-mail does enjoy a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. Also in that same year the case of Pacific Northwest Herb Corp v Thompson 1999 BCJ No 
2772 came before the court. Thompson was an employee of Pacific Northwest who used the 
company’s computer in his home for business and personal purposes. After termination of his 
employment he continued using the company computer for personal purposes. Amongst the 
documents on the computer was a file containing documents relating to the wrongful dismissal action 
he was planning to institute against Pacific Northwest. Before returning the computer to the company 
he hired a computer consultant to erase all the data on the hard drive. His attempts were however 
unsuccessful, and after returning the computer to Pacific Northwest the company was able to restore 
the data. Thompson sought an interdict to prevent Pacific Northwest to exploit the data, claiming that 
his right to privacy and solicitor-client privilege has been infringed. The judge in this case concluded 
that Thompson had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding documents that were created for 
personal use.  
In R v Duarte 1990 1 SCR 945 the judge concluded that although the right to privacy was not absolute, 
it must be “judged against what is reasonable in the circumstances and, amongst other things, is 
dependant upon competing interests such as the relationship between the parties”. The court went even 
further and stated that in order to determine what would amount to ‘reasonable in the circumstances’, 
three considerations must be kept in mind: (i) whether it was reasonable to request surveillance; (ii) 
whether the surveillance was conducted in a reasonable manner; and (iii) whether any other 
alternatives to surveillance were available to the employer. 
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This case has been approved in many other cases. In St Mary’s Hospital and HEU 64 LAC (4th) 382 an 
electrician discovered a video camera in the ceiling of a manager’s office. The local union was 
outraged at this surreptitious surveillance, and filed a grievance. The arbitrator found in this case that 
surveillance can be characterized in three ways: (a) benign surveillance which would entail 
surveillance done for the benefit of the employee; (b) security surveillance which has as its main aim 
to ensure the protection of employees as well as the employer; and (c) surreptitious surveillance which 
represents the most intrusive force of surveillance. The arbitrator was of the opinion that this form of 
surveillance requires strict justification. Furthermore, in Re Toronto Transit Commission and ATU 
Loc 113 (Belsito) 95 LAC (4th) 402 and in New Flyer Industries Ltd and CAW Canada Loc 3003 
(Mogg) 85 LAC (4th) 304 the court acknowledged that “surveillance by an employer may, in certain 
circumstances, infringe upon an employee’s right to privacy to an unreasonable extent”. 
The Privacy Commissioner has made his views on workplace surveillance, the privacy of e-mails and 
the reasonable expectation of privacy clear. The Commissioner states: “I don’t accept that the 
protection necessarily translates into wholesale surveillance of e-mails or computer use. We accept 
that there are stringent limits on an employer’s rights to read employees’ mail, eavesdrop on their 
telephone calls or rifle through their desk drawers. I think we have to look closely at e-mail 
communications to see what principles should apply there as well”. 
The Commissioner went on to comment on the practice of some companies to state in their email 
policies that the employees should have no reasonable expectation of privacy when using the e-mail 
systems: “[t]he law of privacy has developed around the notion of the ‘reasonable expectation’; one of 
the ways that the courts determine whether privacy has been violated has been to determine first 
whether a person could have reasonable expected privacy in a particular place and time. But I don’t 
agree that it follows that an employee’s or anyone’s privacy can be simply eradicated by telling them 
not to expect any. While management has the right and the responsibility to manage, it has to operate 
within limits, including respect for fundamental rights. It is not for management alone to determine 
whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable”. 
Therefore, a clear shift in the pendulum in Canadian law may be observed. In the past emphasis was 
placed on whether or not the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy, today emphasis is 
placed on the question whether or not the surveillance is reasonable. It is now accepted that workplace 
surveillance, whether it be by video camera, server-side computer monitoring, or client-side computer 
monitoring, cannot be justified by simply giving notice to an employee. An investigation will have to 
be launched into the reasonableness of the surveillance. 
Geist identifies six factors which may be taken into consideration when wanting to determine whether 
or not the computer or email surveillance is reasonable in terms of Canadian law: 
(i) The target of the surveillance – Consideration must be given to whether computer 
surveillance will be conducted across the company as a whole or if it will be targeted 
against specific employees; 
(ii) Purpose of the surveillance – Companies that install new surveillance technologies must 
be able to show how these technologies support their objectives; 
(iii) Alternatives to surveillance – It is suggested that other surveillance technologies that are 
much less intrusive on an employee’s right to privacy in the workplace must first be 
investigated; 
(iv) The surveillance technology – The choice of surveillance technology must be reasonable 
taking into account the purpose of the surveillance; 
(v) Adequacy of notice – in terms of the Criminal Code as well as PIPEDA consent must be 
obtained from the employee. This would entail not merely informing employees of the 
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fact of surveillance but also giving them an accurate description of the company’s 
surveillance practices; and 
(vi) The implementation of the surveillance activities – the company will have to ensure that 
unauthorized persons are not able to gain access to the surveillance information. 
3.4 Conclusion 
From the above it may be concluded that in Canadian law neither the right to privacy nor the right to 
surveillance is absolute. Canadian law attempts to find a balance between the interest of the employer 
and the rights of the employee by focusing on the reasonableness of the surveillance. 
4. MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE IN THE WORKPLACE – THE AMERICAN 
POSITION 
4.1 Introduction  
At present the position in America is that no employee has any constitutional, federal or common law 
legal remedies for redress where an employer abuses email and Internet monitoring and surveillance.  
4.2 Constitutional protection against employee monitoring and surveillance 
? Federal constitution 
The US Constitution does not afford anyone the right to privacy expressly. The constitution only 
recognizes privacy as a penumbral theory. This explains why the right to privacy has not been 
extended to protect an employee’s electronic communications. Cherminisky observes: “[m]ost 
Americans would be surprised to learn that there is no right to privacy granted in the United States 
Constitution. The Fourth Amendment protects privacy in limiting police searches and arrests, but 
privacy in terms of autonomy and the right to be left alone by the government is not mentioned in the 
text of the Constitution”. 
Consequently, the present position in the United States is that employees, in a private workplace, are 
not afforded any protection against electronic surveillance because of the doctrine of state 
surveillance. In contrast to this public sector employees have a certain degree of constitutional 
protection against abusive monitoring in the workplace. Included in this would be the right to 
reasonable searches and seizures. American courts have even gone so far as to state that public sector 
employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their emails and Internet 
communications. 
? State constitution 
Privacy protection in respect of state constitutions vary to a great extend. It is however important to 
bear in mind that to date no court has extended state constitutional protection of privacy to email 
monitoring and surveillance in the workplace. Most states do not require employers to give employees 
any form of notification when monitoring their emails and Internet communications. 
4.3 Federal legislation – The ECPA 
? Title I of the ECPA – The Federal Wiretap Statute 
In terms Title I (The federal Wiretap Act) of the ECPA interception of electronic communications 
such as telephone calls and emails are prohibited. The Act prohibits the following activities: 
(i) intercepting or endeavoring to intercept electronic communications; 
(ii) disclosing or endeavoring to disclose intercepted electronic communications; and 
(iii) using the content of intercepted information. 
It therefore follows that if an employer intercepts email or monitors Internet communications of 
his/her employee, his actions will fall within the ambit of the ECPA. The following important 
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observations must be, made in this regard. First, it is required that the interception and/or monitoring 
should be made intentional. Secondly, the content of the communication is only protected as long as it 
is under transmission. Consequently, Title I will not be applicable where an employer searches an 
employee’s stored emails.  
Two exceptions are contained in Title I. First, the ECPA allows service provides to intercept and 
disclose electronic communication if either the sender or the receiver consented thereto, or the 
‘ordinary course of business’ exception can be applied. The latter exception however, proves to be 
highly problematic. 
In order for an employer to make use of the ‘ordinary course of business exception’ it is expected of 
the employer to proof the following: 
(i) the device used to intercept the electronic communication is “a telephone or telegraphic 
instrument, equipment or facility, or a…component thereof,” provided or installed by the 
employer himself/herself; and 
(ii) that the specific device is employed by the employer in his/her ordinary course of 
business.  
It must furthermore be borne in mind that an employer is only authorized to intercept the 
communication for long enough to determine the nature of the conversation. Once the employer has 
determined that the communication is personal in nature he/she must immediately terminate 
interception.  
? Title II of the ECPA – The Stored Communications Act of 2005 
Title II of the ECPA (The Stored Communications Act of 2005) provides guidance when wanting to 
obtain access or disclosure of electronic communication, such as messages left on a voice machine, 
once in storage. A violation of Title II will result in civil liability for any person who (a) intentionally 
accesses, without authorization, a facility through which an electronic communication service is 
provided; or (b) intentionally exceeds an authorization access and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents 
authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage. 
As soon as an electronic message has been stored the SCA will regulate the situation. This is 
irrespective of the length of storage. 
When considering the operation of Title II it becomes evident that emails are generally considered to 
be stored communications in terms of American law. Consequently, employers are authorized to 
access electronic communications under this title. However, this means that Title I of the ECPA is in 
actual fact rendered useless.  
From the above discussion it may be concluded that in virtually all cases decided by American courts 
in the last decade it has been decided that employees do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
In some instance American courts have gone so far as to validate employee monitoring even where 
advance warning was not given to the employee. The following American case law supports this 
statement: 
? Employee monitoring and surveillance without notice 
In Restuccia v Burk Technology 1996 Mass Super LEXIS 367 (Super Ct (Mass) Aug 13 1996) the 
employer neglected to have an email policy stating the possibility that emails can be monitored, stored 
on back-up or that emails may not be used for personal messages. When viewing back-up files the 
employer discovered email messages containing nick-names for the president of the company and 
references to an extra-marital affair with another employee. The president of the company terminated 
the two employee’s employment based on the fact that they were using the email system too much. 
The ex-employees argued that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy because of the fact that 
they had personal passwords to access their message system. the court found that the president’s action 
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of reading the email messages on the back-up system constituted an infringement of the privacy of the 
ex employees. In this case the ex-employees were successful in their claim, but in every other 
workplace interception case the defendant’s were awarded summary judgment in a claim that 
workplace surveillance invaded a plaintiff’s right of privacy. 
Furthermore, in Smyth v Pillsbury Co 914 F Supp 97 (ED Pa 1996) an employee was fired after 
having made negative comments about a sales manager in an email. The email contained treats to “kill 
the backstabbing bastards”. The company had, on various occasions, assured its employees that all 
emails are confidential and privileged. The company based the termination of employment on 
“transmitting what it deemed to be inappropriate and unprofessional comments over the company’s e-
mail system”. The employee however argued wrongful termination. The federal court decided that the 
termination of the employee was justified, as the employee had no expectation of privacy in the 
employer’s email system. The court went even further to state that even if the employee had a 
reasonable  expectation of privacy it would not amount to invasion of privacy if an employer 
intercepted messages on a system it owned.  
Moreover, in McLaren v Microsoft Corp Microsoft 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 4103, 1999 WL 339015 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1999) accessed personal folders on a network in order to investigate claims of sexual 
harassment. The employee claimed that Microsoft had violated his reasonable expectation of privacy. 
The emails that Microsoft eventually uncovered did provide evidence that the employee was engaging 
in a “systematic pattern of sexual harassment”. The court held that it was not going to recognise a 
cause of action for invasion of privacy, even though the employee had a special password and the files 
were marked ‘personal’. The court stated in this case that the decisive factor was that the computer 
was the property of the employer and formed part of the computer environment. The court furthermore 
stated that because of the fact that the folder was transmitted over the network, it was inevitable that it 
would be accessed by a third party at some stage. Consequently, the plaintiff had no expectation of 
privacy with regards to the files marked ‘private’.  
? Employee monitoring and surveillance with  notice 
By implementing an email and Internet policy companies safeguard themselves against any privacy-
based claims by employees. In Bourke v Nissan Motor Corp Nissan California Court of Appeals, 
Second Appellate District, Case No. B068705 (July 1996) made every employee sign a waiver form in 
which they had to acknowledge that they understood that Nissan’s email system was to be used for 
business purposes exclusively. In this case the court decided that this waiver was fatal to any claim an 
employee can bring based on invasion of privacy. 
Furthermore, in Garrity v John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company 2002 US Dist. LEXIS 8343 
(D Mass. May 7, 2000) two long term employees forwarded sexually explicit jokes to third parties. 
One of their co-workers complaint after receiving such an email. The company had an email policy 
providing that “messages that are defamatory, abusive, obscene, profane, sexually orientated, 
threatening or racially offensive” are prohibited. The two woman’s employment was consequently 
terminated. The court dismissed the privacy based action brought by the two women stating that 
employees do not have any reasonable expectation of privacy pertaining to work related emails. The 
court furthermore made a very harsh statement by stating that the fact that the company had an email 
policy was irrelevant. The court concluded that the employer’s right and duty to limit harassment in 
the workplace outweighs any rights the plaintiffs’ though they had in respect of privacy.  
Moreover, in Thygeson v US Bancorp 2004 US Dist. LEXIS 18863 (D. Ore. Sept 15, 2004) the bank’s 
employment handbook stated that employees were prohibited to “use US Bancorp computer resources 
for personal business”. The handbook furthermore stated “do not access inappropriate internet sites 
and do not send emails which may be perceived as offensive, intimidating, or hostile or that are in 
violation of Company policy”. One of Bancorp’s employees were spending more than four hours a day 
visiting non work related Internet sites on his work computer. The company furthermore discovered 
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that he was viewing “inappropriate emails containing pictures of nudity and sexually offensive jokes”. 
The employee was subsequently fired. The employee brought an action against the bank arguing that 
they invaded his privacy as well as the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by 
firing him without awarding him severance pay. The court found that the employee had no expectation 
of privacy when his employer accessed the files on its network that the plaintiff saved using a personal 
password, then this employee had no expectation of privacy in his email ‘merely labeled personal’ 
without even creating a password.  
4.4 Conclusion 
The conclusion must be reached that when it comes the subject matter of workplace monitoring and 
surveillance, all indication are that it is pro-employer. Employees have no real remedies for the abuse 
of email and Internet monitoring and surveillance. Furthermore almost all courts in America have held 
that employees do not have a right to privacy in the workplace. Courts continue to justify their position 
by stating that since business computers are the property of its employers, employers have an 
unfettered right to monitor its usage. American employees will furthermore be unable to find any relief 
in the US constitution, common law of torts or the ECPA.  
5. MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE IN THE WORKPLACE – THE UNITED 
KINGDOM’S PERSPECTIVE 
5.1 Introduction 
The United Kingdom is a member of the European Union. Consequently, the United Kingdom has to 
comply with EU directives on the subject matter of employee monitoring and surveillance. In terms of 
the European Community Treaty it is expected of the UK to propagate enabling legislation which will 
give effect to the fundamental rights as set forth in the Council of Europe Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (ECHR) and legislation of the EU.  
5.2 Regulatory framework 
Because of the operation of the doctrine of vicarious liability, the UK government has accepted that 
employers do have the right to monitor their employees. However, in contrast to the approach 
followed in America, the right of an employer to monitor is balanced with the employee’s right to 
privacy.  
The legal framework for Internet monitoring in the United Kingdom comprises of five main statutes 
and almost no case law on the subject matter.  
? The Data Protection Act of 1998 
All British employers must comply with the United Kingdom’s implementation of the European 
Union Directive on Data Protection in the form of the Data Protection Act of 1998. In terms of the 
DPA data controllers are compelled not only to inform the employee of the monitoring system, but 
also to protect the data processed in accordance with the Data Protection Principles (DPA). 
In terms of the DPA electronic monitoring has to comply with the following requirements: 
(i) the monitoring must be lawful and fair; 
(ii) the monitoring program must be necessary; and 
(iii) the monitoring program must be proportionate to achieving the legitimate business 
objective while simultaneously protecting the right to privacy of the individual employee. 
In terms of the DPA only one exception exists regarding the notification requirement: if electronic 
monitoring is done with the aim of preventing a specific crime the employer will not have to adhere to 
the notice requirement.  
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? The Human Rights Act of 1998 
The DPA furthermore takes cognizance of the Human Rights Act of 1998. In terms of this Act the 
privacy of any private communication, telephone conversation and email communication is expressly 
protected. It is important to observe that the Human Rights Act draws a distinction between public and 
private sector employers. If the employer falls within the ambit of the public sector, the employee will 
have a direct cause of action in terms of the Human Rights Act. 
Employees in the United Kingdom enjoy further protection in terms of article 8 of the ECHR. In terms 
of article 8 of the Act “everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home, and 
his correspondence”. This convention affords private employees with a legal remedy to challenge 
abusive monitoring practices. The European Court of Human Rights has extended the definition of 
‘private life and correspondence’ to include business relations, emails and other electronic 
communications. 
Furthermore, the United Kingdom’s chief regulatory agency (OFTEL) issued in 1999 Guidance on 
recording on private conversations. The aim of these guidelines was to provide employers with 
guidelines when wanting to implement electronic monitoring without violating their employees’ right 
to privacy.  
? The Regulation of Investigative Powers Act of 2000 
In terms of this Act it is a criminal offence to intercept data without authorization. It is however 
important to keep in mind that RIP is not applicable to private telecommunications systems such as 
intranets and Virtual Private Networks. Moreover, no provision in RIP addresses electronic monitoring 
in the workplace expressly. In general employers are permitted to intercept emails and to monitor 
Internet access as long as both the sender and receiver agree thereto. Employers may furthermore only 
intercept emails and Internet communications if the monitoring is conducted in order to carry out the 
employer’s business activities. 
? The Lawful Business Practice Regulations (LBPR) 
This Act governs the rights and responsibilities of businesses relating to monitoring electronic 
communications. This Act provides certain exceptions to the RIP Act. The most important of which is 
that monitoring without compliance with the notice requirement can take place. In terms of this 
exception companies may monitor and keep record of Internet communications in order to comply and 
adhere to regulatory or self-regulatory practices and procedures. There is however a limitation placed 
on monitoring activities by providing that such activities may only take place if a company employee 
uses the computer system within the scope of his/her duties. Furthermore, in terms of the LBPR 
interception without consent is authorized if the interception has one or more of the following 
purposes: 
(i) to establish the existence of facts, to ascertain compliance with the regulatory or self-
regulatory practices or procedures (quality control and training); 
(ii) to prevent or detect crimes; 
(iii) to investigate or detect unauthorized use of telecommunication systems; 
(iv) to secure; and 
(v) to determine whether or not the communications are business communications. 
It should furthermore be kept in mind that interception will only be authorised if the controller of the 
telecommunication system (employer) made reasonable efforts to inform potential users that interception 
may take place. Also the scope of application of this Act is limited to business communication therefore 
the interception of personal communications will not be legal in terms of this act. 
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5.3 Conclusion 
In terms of the RIP Act, LBPR and the DPA it would appear that an employer will only be authorized 
to lawful intercept communications if it is done ‘in the course of transmission’. The legislature 
therefore encourages UK companies to have a clearly Internet and email usage policy in place. If an 
employee wants to base his/her claim on infringement of privacy, the Code of Practice will be the 
most effective regulation for him/her to rely on.  
6. CONLUSION 
It is evident from the preceding discussion that Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom 
have very different views on the protection that should be afforded to employees when dealing with 
monitoring and surveillance in the workplace.  
In America a pro-employer regime is applied in terms of which employees have lost all their privacy 
based actions. Consequently, employees in America have no reasonable expectation of privacy. It 
would appear as if American employers have an absolute immunity against the constitution, common 
law and federal statutory remedies for abusive surveillance practices. In terms of American law it is 
evident that everything including electronic communications on a work computer belongs to the 
employer. Furthermore, business and private communications are deemed to be the property of the 
employer. Therefore, employers are permitted to monitor any electronic communication even if the 
employer has no e-mail and/or Internet usage policy in place which could serve to notify employees of 
the fact that their electronic communications are being monitored. 
In stark contrast to the American position, in the UK the monitoring and surveillance of employees are 
strictly proscribed. In the EU and consequently in the UK, electronic monitoring must be reasonably 
based, proportional, transparent and non-discriminatory. The European Court of Justice feels that it is 
very important for companies to have written e-mail and Internet usage policies stating what the 
company’s position is regarding employee surveillance and monitoring. This is in contrast with the 
position in America where courts have allowed the surveillance of emails even in situations where the 
company guaranteed its employees privilege and confidentiality.  
The Canadian position relating to employee monitoring and surveillance fits in comfortably 
somewhere between the UK and the USA. Although this country have enacted legislation regulating 
employee monitoring and surveillance, with a built-in notification requirements. The biggest 
deficiencies encountered in these statutes are that they only contain a notification requirement and not 
a consent requirement.  
The question may be asked which approach is correct? Although from a legal perspective most 
academics would insist that the United Kingdom’s approach is correct, the writer is of the opinion that 
the current political and social climate must play a very important role in deciding which approach a 
country should take to this subject matter. Moreover, when considering the fact that a company can 
incur legal liability for the illegal and inappropriate acts performed by its employees when making use 
of the corporate computer resources and systems, the writer feels that an employer should have the 
right to monitor e-mail and Internet usage without too many restraints being placed on him/her. 
Therefore, the writer is in favor of the American position pertaining to this subject matter. Perhaps 
countries such as the United Kingdom and Canada should rather ask themselves if they are not 
empowering employees too much, because at the end of the day, it is still the employer’s computer 
resources and systems that are being used, so why should an employer not be afforded the right to 
protect its own assets through monitoring and surveillance, especially when considering the fact that 
an employer can be faced with numerous lawsuit based on the inappropriate use of its computer assets 
and resources?  
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